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Crit Disk

ROMANTICISM’S GRAY MATTER
by Nancy Easterlin

T

he antagonism between science and the humanities is an old
story, one whose basic themes were inspired by a new understanding of the utility of science that emerged from the Enlightenment. If
faith in the efﬁcacy of human reason to renew human society was no
longer quite so robust after Robespierre’s Reign of Terror, science itself
did not suffer but instead assumed the central place in intellectual
inquiry. Half a century later, the opposition between humanistic inquiry
and science not only carried over into the conception of literary studies
in its embryonic phase as an academic discipline; the rise of science
provided, ironically, a primary impetus for the institutionalization of
English studies, since the study of language and literature was envisioned as an arena of spiritual values and social polish. But according to
Gerald Graff, the picture is even more complicated than this: the
oppositions between literature and science are largely matched by those
within English/literary studies from the very beginning. If English was
envisioned as a repository of value and cultivation on the one hand, it
was driven, under the inﬂuence of science, to professionalize and
develop a research industry on the other—which itself fostered a divide
between criticism and academic research, areas that have only recently
come together.1
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Since conﬂicted attitudes toward science were thus at the heart of
literary studies from the very beginning, it is hardly surprising that
debates about the relevance of science to literary theory and criticism
are vital today. These debates are the healthy result of the twentieth
century’s attempts to apply scientiﬁc research and models to literature,
for early efforts at scientiﬁc criticism help locate both the potential
beneﬁts and possible drawbacks of interdisciplinary approaches. Yet
some humanistic research paradigms have remained largely immune to
the inﬂuence of science, maintaining the two-cultures tradition by
virtue of the body of knowledge they adopt—and therefore by what
they implicitly exclude—to frame our understanding of written works.
Chief among these are literary history and the history of ideas, which
have drawn principally on the fellow humanities of philosophy and
history, and only superﬁcially or sporadically on the history and
philosophy of science. (Interestingly, despite differences in theory,
method, and values, recent projects like the new historicism are in this
respect generally continuous with traditional literary historical practice.) In British Romanticism and the Science of Mind, Alan Richardson
expands the parameters of the history-of-ideas approach within literary
criticism, rendering it more fully congenial to developments within
scientiﬁc thought. With great diplomacy, Richardson points to the
limited conception of context that has informed historical accounts of
British literary romanticism, and proceeds to demonstrate what a
knowledge of romantic-era brain science can bring to our understanding of the ideas and works of a selection of romantic-era writers. The
result is a book that, in providing a detailed account of the major
theories of brain-mind and in constructing the plausible grounds of
inﬂuence on several major literary ﬁgures, largely succeeds in the
difﬁcult task of appealing to an interdisciplinary audience.
As Richardson notes in his preface and ﬁrst chapter, the overlap
between literary and scientiﬁc representations of mind has been
generally neglected in romantic scholarship. Work on the romantic
mind has, for the most part, drawn selectively on Hartleyan associationism, psychoanalysis, and the German idealist tradition within epistemology, even though the historical period of British literary romanticism
(roughly 1789–1832) corresponds with an unprecedented development of theories of the brain and nervous system, many of which were
vigorously discussed—in no small part for their ideologically inﬂammatory implications—in the major literary periodicals of the day. To
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remedy the neglect of contemporaneous science, Richardson supplies a
discussion of the major brain scientists in his ﬁrst chapter, following this
with four chapters on major ﬁgures and works of literary romanticism
(Coleridge, Wordsworth, Austen’s Persuasion, and Keats); a ﬁnal chapter on some broader romantic themes and issues; and a brief epilogue
that tactfully considers the characterization of romanticism by presentday cognitive theorists. Since everyone who likes ideas, it seems to me,
should take an interest in the organ of knowledge and its history,
Richardson’s account of the brain-mind will appeal to an array of
readers across academic disciplines, supplying a fuller picture of the
history of brain science while simultaneously correcting received generalizations about romanticism. But if the rewards of this book to the
nonspecialist are considerable, to the student of romanticism they are
indispensable, articulating the basis of poetical theories and methods
that enriches our comprehension of them at the very least, and in some
cases makes them seem, as Richardson remarks in his discussion of
Wordsworth’s poetical theory, something less than “anachronistic,
exceptional, or particularly odd” (p. 77).
One has something of an experience of déjà vu in reading Richardson’s
account of the brain science of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, whereby ideas that seem so exciting and vital in current
cognitive science are echoed in the words of theorists living two
hundred years ago. Richardson outlines in some detail the theories of
the most prominent brain scientists of the time: F. J. Gall, Pierre-JeanGeorge Cabanis, Erasmus Darwin, Charles Bell, Sir William Lawrence,
J. G. Spurzheim, and George Combe. (Here and elsewhere in the book,
he takes account of their most central predecessors, including David
Hartley, Denis Diderot, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, and J. G. von
Herder.) In spite of some signiﬁcant theoretical differences, these
scientists, writing just in the period in which people were beginning to
assert the unity of brain-mind, shared a broad set of assumptions that
they sought to establish via observation and argument: the mind is in
the brain, and it is an active processor; body-mind functions are best
understood biologically rather than mechanically; the brain is complex
and constantly active; and human functionality is best understood in
protoevolutionary adaptative and developmental terms. All were
antidualists and believed in universal and innate human tendencies
toward sociality largely evident in a shared language of gesture,
expression, rhythm, rhyme, and the like. Their theoretical positions
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were inﬂuenced by Spurzheim and Gall’s innovations in brain dissection (in the 1780s and ’90s), and by Galvani’s experiments in animal
electricity (in the 1790s).
As might be expected, the implications of these ideas were no less
controversial two hundred years ago than they are today, and many
commentators sought to discredit the creeping materialism of romanticera brain scientists. Gall, who especially emphasized the brain’s complexity, joined Spurzheim in the rather more scientiﬁcally dubious
enterprise of fathering craniology and organology, the precursors to
phrenology. Gall and Spurzheim’s facultative conceptions of mind were
widely attacked in the popular reviews of the time, and became
connected with “French” radicalism—repeating a pattern of associating
scientiﬁc theories with political and ideological convictions that developed in the early chaotic years of the French revolution and that had
then damaged Erasmus Darwin’s reputation. Sir William Lawrence,
already suspect because of his link to the radical Godwin circle, went so
far as to assert, in 1819, that man should properly be studied via
zoology. When Richardson points out that Bell’s Idea of a New Anatomy
(1811) did not provoke such attacks, in large part because Bell was a
devout Anglican free of radical associations, one is reminded of the
large part that pragmatic considerations play in the acceptance or
rejection of ideas in a given historical period. Thus, although Bell held
a complex sense of the human nervous system and a holistic view of the
mind-brain-body operating within the natural environment, one that
superseded Erasmus Darwin’s in rejecting the idea of a generalized
sensorium and in promoting instead an understanding of the connection between sensory pathways and brain, the antidualist implications
of his thought were not so readily perceived.
Richardson’s knowledge of romantic-era theories along with his
judicious assessments of their likely inﬂuence on the era’s literary
authors deepens or adjusts our perspective on the literature, especially
in the cases of Wordsworth and Keats. Wordsworth has always given
trouble to those who have sought to offer systematic philosophical or
psychological explanations of his thought, not least because neither his
poetry nor his discursive writings are logically systematic. Indeed, a
variety of factors—including his dislike for explaining his work, his later
conservative politics, and our day’s constructivist assumption that
human nature is itself a naïve construct—have hardly encouraged a
picture of the poet as forward-thinking in any respect. David Hartley’s
associationist psychology has been the main touchstone for psychologi-
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cal explanations of the poetry, according to which the repeated
association of sensations with one another results in internal representations, so that the later experience of a single one of these sensations
will evoke the whole constellation: “Any sensations A, B, C, &c. by being
associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a power over
the corresponding ideas a, b, c, &c. that any one of the sensations A, when
impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the mind b, c, &c. the ideas of the rest.”2
While Hartley’s theory, centrally important in the history of physiological psychology and certainly an inﬂuence on romantic-era thought, has
undoubtedly helped explain something about Wordsworth’s structural
and semantic decisions in many poems (from a short lyric like “The
Two April Mornings” to The Prelude, the long poem on the growth of the
poet’s mind), it was limited by the biological theories of its time as well
as the principles from Hobbes and Locke to which it was indebted. As
Richardson puts it in his characterization of some of Coleridge’s more
astute criticisms of Hartleyan associationism,
Hartley’s system suffered . . . from the “passive” and mechanical approach
to perception and other mental acts that limited associationist accounts
generally; Hartley’s formulations implied a “senseless and passive memory,”
a cognitive process characterized by “mere lawlessness.” (p. 11)

Although scholars before Richardson have noted connections between
romantic poets and contemporaneous brain scientists, these have not
been extensively articulated before, and as a result Hartley has remained the most prominent source for explanations of Wordsworth’s
psychologizing. The problem is that the Wordsworthian conception of
mind is anything but mechanical and passive, his language anything but
formulaic. Richardson argues convincingly that Wordsworth’s conception of the mind as an active, perceiving organ was inﬂuenced by
Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia, a text that Wordsworth either read or knew
well from extensive conversations with Coleridge. Published in 1794,
Zoonomia, in contrast to Hartley’s 1749 Observations on Man, His Frame,
His Duty, and His Expectations, posits the centrally active nature of mind,
and diverges as well from the Lockean inheritance in asserting the
internal nature of sensation as well as the actuality of innate desires and
unconscious processes. Noting the surprising parallels between Herder’s
and Wordsworth’s descriptions of the human infant and pointing as
well to Wordsworth’s use of words like “brain” and “organic” in the
1790s, which ﬁnd their likely source in Darwin’s protoevolutionist
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conception of the mind-brain, Richardson claims that the poet was, for
“at least a few years, in the midst of one of the most daring intellectual
ventures of his era—the reinvention, along naturalistic, physiological,
and ecological lines, of the study of human nature” (p. 67). Thus
building on the research of H. W. Piper, Richard Matlack, and others,
Richardson does romantics scholarship a valuable service in providing
crucial new evidence for the originality of Wordsworth’s thought.
Wordsworth’s theories of language form an additional topic in this
chapter, and here Richardson likewise shows how the poet’s thinking
on the subject is incompletely understood when viewed as primarily a
revision of Enlightenment primitivism. Early Enlightenment speculation on language tended to claim that there was no natural basis for
mature language and reﬂection, that nature is fundamentally left
behind with the human individual’s introduction into culture and
language, and that the rational mind of civilized man is distinct from
the savage mind of primitive peoples. In contrast,
The overall effect of late Enlightenment speculation on linguistic origins
was to weaken the distinction between natural and artiﬁcial languages
while maintaining that between natural and artiﬁcial signs. In place of an
older consensus stressing the human uniqueness and divine origins of
language . . . Wordsworth’s generation inherited a thoroughly naturalistic
approach, alive to continuities as well as human and “animal,” learned
and instinctive communication systems, prizing the emotive as well as the
rational aspects of language, and increasingly grounding linguistic behavior in human physiology rather than a disembodied mind or “REASON.”
(p. 76)

Thus, earlier theorists like Horne Tooke, who assume that natural
language is displaced by symbolic language (on this view, the interjections and babblings of early childhood are simply replaced by mature
language), provide no very clear guide to Wordsworth’s theoretical
claim to write in a real language of men connected to sensation and
emotion, to his discussion of meter and pleasure, and to his poetical
use of extrasemantic qualities like repetition and interjections. As
Richardson sensitively notes, these interjections are a fundamental
feature of Lyrical Ballads, contributing to the “overall feel” of the
collection (p. 81). Coleridge’s later criticisms in Biographia Literaria, too
often accepted as the guide to the weaknesses in Wordsworth’s theories—one man the intellectual, the other the creative artist, as a central
cliché of romantic scholarship would have it—reﬂect that poet’s own

Nancy Easterlin

449

insistence that the best part of language derives from reason and
reﬂection, a view that minimizes the role of the body and thus accords
with thinkers of the early Enlightenment more closely than Wordsworth’s
own views. This discussion of Wordsworth’s theory of language could be
strengthened by some recourse to the context perhaps most centrally
important to the poet himself, that of the literary conventions of his
day. If claims for the value of a real language seem vague, theoretically
unsophisticated, and sentimentally primitivistic, they are a good deal
less so when weighed against the tired imperatives of outworn Augustan
conventions, such as chronically inverted syntax. Grammatically speaking, it may be just ﬁne to claim, as Thomas Gray does in a sonnet
Wordsworth criticizes, that “In vain to me the smiling mornings shine,”
but this is an artiﬁcial rather than a commonplace use of English, one
whose preciousness belies the melancholy it is meant to convey. In the
context of such bad verse, it is not difﬁcult to imagine why Wordsworth
would overstate his case for the virtues of rustic life and the expressive
language of humble people.
In the latter part of this chapter, Richardson illustrates the continuity
between Wordworth’s views and those of contemporary cognitive
linguists such as Mark Johnson and Eve Sweetser, who argue that our
fundamental structures of thought and language derive from bodily
experience. Even while providing an impressive explanation for
Wordsworth’s theories by placing them within a long tradition of
thought about human language that runs from the late Enlightenment
up to the present, Richardson, citing the criticism of romanticist David
Miall, is careful to point to the narrower focus of cognitive linguistics,
which does not emphasize passion and emotion or the extrasemantic
features of communication: “In granting a primary role to feeling and
emotion within an embodied and ecological understanding of mind
and culture, Wordsworth is closer to the brain science of his time than
to what is sometimes called ‘cognitivism’” (p. 91). Clearly, cognitive
linguistics pursues a narrower focus, in keeping with the increasing
tendency toward specialization that has gone hand-in-hand with the
disciplinary development of psychology and linguistics in the past two
centuries. True to his prefatory claim not to remark on the validity of
either romantic-era theorists or contemporary neuroscience, Richardson
simply places Wordsworth in context here; yet it is hard not to feel, at
the conclusion of this chapter, that cognitive linguistics runs the risk of
cutting itself off from the affective and bodily experience it acknowledges as the very basis of human thought and language.
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Like his discussion of Wordsworth, Richardson’s chapter on Keats
does an exceptional job of employing research in romantic-era brain
science to bring together and support some of the best insights of
earlier criticism, placing our understanding of the connection between
the poet’s medical knowledge and his poetics on ﬁrmer ground. It has
long been assumed that Keats’s surviving notes from his training at
Guy’s Hospital were from the lectures of the famous anatomist Sir
Astley Cooper, but since Keats never produced a fair copy of these
notes, it has been difﬁcult to conﬁrm this deﬁnitively. Richardson has
performed a valuable bit of scholarly detection in locating the notes of
an American student, Edward Reynolds. In Richardson’s assessment,
Reynold’s notebook,
The Twelve first Lectures of Mr Astley Coopers Anatomical Course delivered at St.
Thomas’ Theatre, corresponds so closely to Keats’s more fragmentary notes
that there is no longer reason to doubt which lecture course Keats’s notes
reﬂect. Based on similarities in organization and phrasing, moreover,
Cooper seems to have altered his lectures on the nervous system very
little. (p. 119)

In spite of the stereotypical image of Keats as a dreamy poet ill-suited
to medical training, he was probably an excellent student, “particularly
intrigued by Cooper’s innovative teaching on the brain and nerves” (p.
118). Cooper’s lectures emphasize that the human body is an integrated system, within which sensation is a process, not an organ in the
brain, and the anatomist’s interest in the manifold effects of head
injury illustrate his focus on the interrelatedness of all parts of the
system. Quoting from the notes of Keats and Reynolds and from
Cooper himself, Richardson produces a concrete feeling for the
medical understanding of “the interconnectedness of psychological
and physiological functions” that provides the basis for Keats’s understanding of passion and of his poetical expression.
It is not Richardson’s goal to offer close readings of literary works in
this book; nevertheless, in his glosses of selected poetical passages and
his attention to the physiological basis of Keats’s poetics, Richardson
beautifully re-creates the physical immediacy of the verse. Drawing, for
instance, on M. H. Abrams’s insight that Keats has a remarkable ability
to bring the physical qualities of speech together with meaning,
Richardson analyzes a variety of sound patterns in brief passages,
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connecting them to Bell’s fascination with the physiological effects of
emotion—the lungs, thorax, and mouth are not simply the pathway for
the expression of emotion but integral to the emotional state; hence, in
“Lamia,” “The throat throbs in literal as well as metaphoric sympathy
with the heart . . . –‘Deaf to his throbbing throat’s long, long melodious
moan . . . the ‘thro’ clusters [force] the tongue back and [narrow] the
throat for the ‘r’ and then [open] it up again to intone the vowel” (p.
140). This discussion of sounds constitutes but a few brief pages of
Richardson’s chapter on Keats, yet the preceding assessment of Keats’s
training, the explication of Cooper’s teachings about the action of the
circulation and lungs in sexual passion, and the detailed reproduction
of Bell’s illustration of the nerves running from chest to brain at the
beginning of the chapter so well prepare the reader for the comments
on sound that, reading silently, one remembers the precise physical
sensations Keats evokes—the pressure in the chest, straining in the
throat—and thus reexperiences the physicality of the verse while
simultaneously understanding how it works. This is no mean feat in
literary criticism, which so often, as an explanatory enterprise, succumbs to the risk of divorcing us from our feelings, even those feelings
the poet has so consciously sought to evoke. Fifty years ago, Douglas
Bush characterized Keats as the poet of the material sublime and thus
illustrated that the unity of consciousness and the attendant sense of
selﬂess euphoria and peace—of negative capability, in Keats’s own
phrase—traditionally associated with transcendence is, in Keats’s poetry,
attained through immersion in actuality, especially in a poem like “To
Autumn,” the last of Keats’ great odes. Unmistakably, the yearning for
transcendence recurs over and over again in Keats’s poetry, but just as
unmistakably sublimity is only experienced here, in the physical world
and, as Richardson would have us realize, through the bodily processes
that constitute our unity with that nonhuman world as well as our
emotional and “spiritual” attachments to it. In a nod to Bush, Richardson
renames such Keatsian moments of psychic unity the neural sublime,
thus contributing further holism to Bush’s original analysis, whereby
the unity of matter outside the self is no longer implicitly or explicitly
distinct from the system of the human organism.
“Keats and the glories of the brain” is undoubtedly, in my view, the
highpoint of a book that offers throughout much of great worth, and
I’d like to consider for a moment why this is the case. While many
intellectuals of the romantic era were acquainted with the work of their
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day’s brain scientists, or at least with the major controversies surrounding
their theories, Keats had a professional knowledge of these theories,
which is something else entirely. Indeed, it would seem that a trained
apothecary, as was Keats, must of necessity focus his attention on the
body and its processes, and thus such a person would be better
prepared to accept an integrated view of mind and body based in a
materialist perspective. (Foucault would perhaps insist that a person
with such training would be unable to see the world otherwise, the
training in essence interpellating him in the discourse system.) In
short, of all the writers Richardson takes up, Keats was closest to these
theories and least likely to reject them because of their troubling
implications. Although as an extremely ill young man he might have
wished to see life in some other way, both personal experience and
professional training placed the dominion of the body at the center of
his way of seeing, and all this enables the direct connections Richardson
makes between the scientiﬁc research and Keats’s poetic techniques—
connections that, to my mind, are difﬁcult to argue with.
Yet as the chapter on Wordsworth illustrates, much can be gained
when the connections are less direct, especially if the critic focuses on a
period when the poet was enthusiastically receptive to new ideas.
Coleridge, however, is quite a different kettle of ﬁsh, and Richardson’s
chapter on this poet, while certainly containing much of interest, is the
least striking portion of the book, in no little part because Coleridge, an
enthusiastic intellectual, was no less eager to react to new ideas than to
grasp them in the ﬁrst place. Hence, the question Richardson proposes
as the focus of his chapter—why did Coleridge suppress “Kubla Khan”
for so long?—and the ultimate answer—because the image of the
unpredictable human mind operating independent of the individual’s
will depicted in the prefatory note and the body of the poem itself was
utterly heretical and threatening to the poet who would later limn the
human creative imagination as a unifying and godlike entity—conﬁrms
our received image of Coleridge. If one thing is consistent about this
poet, it is his self-division, and it is therefore expected rather than
surprising that he would write a poem in which personal taboos not
only become central themes but also provoke feelings of guilt, which
themselves are expressed in the poem. Since this psychological pattern,
evident in poems other than “Kubla Khan,” including “The Eolian
Harp” and “Dejection: An Ode,” would tend to exaggerate rather than
alleviate conﬂicts within the self while simultaneously canvassing ideas
the poet eschewed, the wonder would be that Coleridge published any
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of his poetry at all, were he not so demonstrably additionally endowed
with the confessional impulse (the unconscious goal of which was,
undoubtedly, to share some of the guilt around). In spite of his fervent
intellectualism, Coleridge was fundamentally less personally secure and
more religiously orthodox than Wordsworth or Keats, and thus fundamentally averse to a protoevolutionary conception of human beings.
Richardson might have achieved more in this chapter had he broadened his discussion to include some of the other poetry—for instance,
“Dejection” suggests that the attempt to control cognitive processes
results in a new kind of internal chaos, whereby abstruse researches
constrict and strangle the mind, divorcing the self from the ability to
experience feelings that are nonetheless cognitively apparent. Something might be gained by comparing the many times in Coleridge’s
poetry that the mind seems to forego the directions of its purported
master. In any case, Coleridge’s reservations, both intellectual and
personal, about the implications of brain science probably successfully
guarded his poetry against the incursions of materialist heresy.
Several matters that arise throughout the book and that might seem,
initially, to be leading us down the garden path of scholarly trivia—
psychoactive drugs, head injuries, dreams—turn out to have a central
place in Richardson’s account, for studies of the effects of drugs and
injuries as well as of the cause of dreams pointed uniformly to the
bodily basis of mind, and thus were crucial to building the case that the
mind is in the brain. From his medical use of laudanum and his
participation in Humphry Davies’s nitrous oxide experiments in the
1790s, Coleridge himself was uncomfortably aware of the causal relationship between ingestion and subsequent mental state, and it is this
evidence of the material nature of mind that lies behind the hallucinatory “Kubla Khan.” Head injuries, which showed the more permanent
effect on mind of physiological damage, were likewise central to the
argument that mind resided in the material entity of the body-brain. In
his short, useful chapter on Austen’s Persuasion, which argues that
Austen’s approach to feeling, mental states, and innate disposition are
all inﬂuenced by romantic-era brain science, making this novel “romantic” in opposition to her other works, Richardson puts Louisa Musgrove’s
head injury in the context of the times. The fall that brings about an
apparently fundamental change in Louisa’s character has proved
difﬁcult for critics to discuss, but Richardson reminds us that head
injuries were a politically loaded topic at the time. Certainly, Austen is
having a bit of fun with her reader, but in her day that bit of fun
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included the serious reminder of arguments for the material nature of
mind.
In the ﬁnal portion of Romanticism and the Science of Mind, Richardson
expands his discussion to suggest how knowledge of romantic-era brain
science might revise our notion of romanticism, both within literary
studies and intellectual culture at large. Noting two opposed traditions
within literary criticism—one highlighting romanticism’s claim for a
universal humanity, the other insisting that romanticism turns away
from an eighteenth-century emphasis on a uniform human nature—
Richardson suggests that
the shift from a mechanistic and dualistic to a biological, embodied view
of human nature entails not so much an abandonment as a radical
reformulation of human universals. In some cases, their corporeal and
emotive approach to human nature enables Romantic writers to reassert
shared human features rejected by an earlier generation of thinkers . . . .
For some Romantic thinkers, embodied universalism set important limits
to the new time-bound (evolutionary, historicist) relativism. But these
universalist and relativistic tendencies could be found together, sometimes in tension, sometimes in outright contradiction . . . . (p. 152)

Richardson here encourages a history of ideas that is both broad and
extensive; that takes account of the coexistence of seemingly incompatible ideas; that recognizes how, over time, rather different concepts may
be signiﬁed by the same words; and that distinguishes politically
motivated uses of scientiﬁc theories from legitimate uses of them. At a
time when literary theory and criticism has been for several decades
very free with grand generalizations (about the cultural construction of
human nature and the self, for instance), Richardson’s circumspect
account implies that, if we take more care with our ideas, our pains will
be rewarded. So, too, Richardson urges contemporary cognitivists to
avoid homogenizing generalizations about romanticism (a concept
whose usefulness, it is worth noting, has been questioned for over ﬁfty
years), and to attend to the striking continuities between romantic-era
thinking about the brain-mind and contemporary theories. Though
understated in his criticism of others and modest about the extent to
which he seeks to redraw the map of intellectual history, Richardson
suggests a signiﬁcant reorientation in our approach to romanticism.
This judicious, well-researched book provides a welcome impetus for
further interdisciplinary criticism, and in the process renders the
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sometimes-perplexing matter of romanticism a little less amorphous, a
little less gray.
University of New Orleans
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